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Abstract 
Contrary to the wide majority of studies that try to characterise EU external governance by 
looking at the macro structures of association relations, our comparative analysis shows that 
overarching foreign policy initiatives such as the EEA, Swiss-EU Bilateralism or the ENP 
have  little  impact  on  the  modes  how  the  EU  seeks  to  expand  its  policy  boundaries  in 
individual sectors. In contrast, modes of external governance follow sectoral dynamics which 
are  astonishingly  stable  across  countries.  These  findings  highlight  the  importance  of 
institutional  path-dependencies  in  projecting  governance  modes  from  the  internal  to  the 
external  constellation,  and  question  the  capacity  to  steer  these  functionalist  patterns  of 
external governance through rationally planned foreign policy initiatives. 
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Introduction 
The study of EU association relations cuts across the division between studies of foreign 
policy and policy analyses that investigate the external dimension of EU sectoral policies. 
Although the topic of external governance has started to be studied from both perspectives, 
the relationship between the two has rarely been addressed. Taking a comparative view on 
three  macro-institutional  frameworks  of  EU  neighbourhood  relations  and  the  modes  of  
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external governance within five policy sectors, we seek to shed light on the relevance of 
differing macro-institutional frameworks of association for the sectoral dynamics of external 
governance.  Echoing  the  literature  on  the  variety  of  policy  modes  in  the  EU’s  “internal” 
governance  (Wallace  2000;  Verdun  and  Tömmel  2008),  we  question  the  accuracy  of 
generalising  characterisation  of  neighbourhood  policies  as  being  “quasi-colonial”  (Tovias 
2006 with regard to the EEA) or relying on a conditionality framework (Cremona & Hillion 
2006; Kelley 2006; Magen 2006 with regard to the ENP). In contrast, our argument is that EU 
external  governance  is  less  a  product  of  high-level  foreign  policy  initiatives  such  as  the 
European Economic Area (EEA) or the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Rather than 
mirroring  the  properties  of  the  overarching  association  frameworks,  sectoral  modes  of 
external governance reflect quite consistent legal and institutional shapes that derive from the 
ways the EU deals internally with these policies.  
We substantiate the thesis of EU external governance as a decentralised, functionally driven 
and differentiated process of expanding sectoral integration with a most-dissimilar-systems 
design (Przeworski and Teune 1970) by comparing three macro-institutional models applying 
to  six  heterogeneous  countries  in  terms  of  size,  wealth,  and  region  (Moldova,  Morocco, 
Norway,  Switzerland,  Tunisia,  Ukraine)  and  five  policy  sectors  with  varying  degrees  of 
interdependence  and  politicisation  (research,  transport/aviation,  environment/water,  asylum 
policy, police cooperation). By so doing, we are able to show that the external modes of 
sectoral governance mainly reflect internal modes of sectoral governance, quite independently 
from  macro-institutional  structures.  This  continuation  of  internal  modes  of  governance  is 
relatively stable even if we account for alternative explanations such as power constellations, 
situations of interdependence, or domestic factors. Whereas these factors cannot account for 
the  institutional  modes  of  sectoral  governance,  they  do  account  for  differences  across 
countries.  
After a short theoretical reflection on modes of governance in “composite” neighbourhood 
policies we start with delineating a typology of external governance structures that forms the 
basis of the macro-institutional (section three) and sectoral (section four) comparison. We 
then scrutinize the links and discontinuities between these two levels of external governance 
and close with some conclusions on the relationship between the functionalist and the more 
political dynamics of EU external governance. 
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Modes of governance in composite policies 
The notion of European external  governance is indebted to an institutionalist agenda that 
directs attention at institutionalised patterns in which interdependence between political units 
– in the present case the EU and respective third countries – are coordinated. Comparable to 
the case of EU enlargement, EU neighbourhood policies are characterised by a dual structure 
composed of, on the one hand, the overarching “macro policy”, laying down overall the goals 
and instruments of these privileged relations, and the “meso policies”, relating to the sectoral 
modes of interaction (Sedelmeier  2005, 2007).  Whereas the “macro policies” such  as the 
EEA, Swiss-EU Bilateral Treaties or the ENP result from coordinated, political processes of 
foreign policy-making, the “meso policies” reflect the external dimension of internal sectoral 
integration. These external dimensions have usually been motivated as functionally-driven 
anwers to situations of interdependence and to the externalities produced within the individual 
sectors  such  as  the  environment,  energy,  migration  management,  or  the  fight  against 
organised  crime  and  others.  They  thus  follow  primarily  internal,  sectoral  or  functional 
dynamics, rather than overarching foreign policy goals (see e.g. Bauer et al. 2007; Lavenex 
2004; Wolff, Wichmann, Mounier 2009). The tension that arises is that from the “macro” 
foreign  policy  perspective,  EU  neighbourhood  relations  must  draw  on  these  decentralised 
“meso” policies in order to fulfill their goals (Sedelmeier 2007: 280). Conversely, this also 
means that from a foreign policy perspective, the “meso” policies should be “steerable” and 
follow the macro structures. 
Our  analysis  of  governance  modes  at  the  macro  and  meso  levels  is  inspired  by  the 
governance-turn in comparative politics and draws on the typologies of governance developed 
therein (Scharpf 1997; Williamson 1975). On this basis, we distinguish between hierarchy, 
network and market modes of governance (Lavenex et al. 2007; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 
2009).  Each  mode  of  governance  is  composed  of  two  dimensions:  on  the  one  hand,  the 
regulatory  level  of  rule  expansion  (here:  legalisation)  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
organisational level of rule-making (here: institutionalisation). 
Hierarchy is a critical terminology in the international arena given the fact that its antonym, 
anarchy, is the central tenet of traditional International Relations theorising. Hierarchy serves 
as  a  descriptor  for  a  mode  of  coordination  characterised  by  a  strongly  legalised  and 
institutionalised asymmetric interconnection between the EU and a third country. According 
to the literature, the degree of legalisation may vary in three dimensions: obligation, i.e. the  
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degree to which actors are bound by a rule or a set of rules; precision, i.e. the degree to which 
rules  define  the  respective  conduct  they  require  or  authorise;  and  delegation,  i.e.  the 
delegation of the authority to implement, interpret and apply the rules to a third party (Abbott 
et al. 2000). Adapting the distinction to the present context, we talk about a hierarchical mode 
of external governance when the role of European (i.e. supranational) law is strong, when the 
conduct  of  a  non-member  state  is  bound  by  the  predetermined  obligations  of  the  acquis 
communautaire and when there is an independent judicial review of the conduct of the non-
member state. With respect to the institutionalisation, a hierarchical type of coordination is 
characterised by a profound asymmetry between the “rulers” and the “ruled” as well as formal 
and centralised macro-institutions with dense interactions and little room for third countries to 
negotiate on their commitments (exclusiveness).  
In contrast, market describes a mode of coordination characterised by the relative weakness of 
formal  relationships.  A  market  constellation  corresponds  to  different  but  generally  much 
lower degrees of legalisation and institutionalisation. The ideal-type market corresponds to 
what International Relations scholars traditionally describe as anarchy. With regard to EU 
external  relations,  there  is  no  overarching  legal  commitment  to  cooperation,  and 
approximation to the acquis is not the point of reference. The contents of cooperation is thus 
not predetermined but subject to negotiations, and no systematic monitoring of compliance 
occurs. Even if there is an asymmetry between the EU and a third country in terms of power 
or resources, relations are formally horizontal and non-exclusive. Rather than being governed 
by a centralised macro-institutional structure and joint institutions, interaction occurs more 
ad-hoc and on a decentralised basis (i.e. within policy fields).  
These  informal  processes  of  coordination  still  differ  from  networks  as  our  third  type  of 
coordination. Parties in network constellation also act in a formally symmetrical relationship. 
This implies that despite a dominance of the EU's agenda, third countries have to agree with 
the selection of topics of cooperation and can bring in their own priorities. The coordination 
of  interdependence  in  a  network  type  of  interactions  requires  a  certain  degree  of 
institutionalisation  and  the  existence  of  central  coordination  structures  goes  along  with 
decentralised  units  of  interaction;  while  ties  can  be  formal  and  informal.  The  basis  for 
interaction in networks are international law and voluntary agreements, and the norms used 
are inspired by the acquis but not precisely pre-determined. This goes along with a shared 
political rather than judicial monitoring of the implementation of agreed commitments.   
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The following table summarises these considerations.  
Table 1: Summary of Analytical Dimensions  
Dimension of 
governance 
Criteria  Indicators 
Supranational law (++) 
International law  and voluntary agreements (+) 
 
Obligation 
no legally binding obligation (–) 
same precision as acquis (++) 
acquis but with flexibility (+) 
 
Precision 
subject to negotiation (–) 
judicial control (++) 
political monitoring (+) 
 
 
 
 
Legalisation 
 
Delegation 
no monitoring (–) 
tight centralised (++) 
lose centralised (+) 
 
Centralisation 
Decentralised (–) 
high (++) 
medium (+) 
 
Density 
ad hoc (–) 
EU agenda (++) 
EU agenda but consensus required (+) 
 
 
 
 
Institutionalisation 
 
Exclusivenes
s  Common agenda (–) 
 
Table 2: Summary of ideal-types 
  Hierarchy  Market  Network 
Obligation  ++  _  + 
Precision  ++  _  + 
 
Legalisation. 
Delegation  ++  _  + 
Centralisation  ++  _  + 
Density  ++  _  + 
 
Institutionalisation. 
Exclusiveness  ++  _  _ 
 
These ideal types are heuristic devices and shall not be confounded with the complexity of the 
empirical reality. One empirical observation that we need to bear in mind when studying these 
modes of governance and their interaction is for instance that the shadow of hierarchy may 
impact upon other governance forms such as networks or markets (Scharpf 1997: 197-205; 
Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2008). Notwithstanding this caveat, the following sections use these 
ideal types to characterise first the macro-level configurations of external governance, in order 
to contrast them in a second step with the sectoral modes of governance. 
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Macro-structures of external governance  
European Economic Area  
The European Economic Area (EEA) combines high levels of legalisation with a centralised, 
dense  and  exclusive  format  of  institutionalisation  and  thus  comes  close  to  a  hierarchical 
structure. The asymmetry of obligations was compensated by various forms of participation, 
yet at subordinate, technical levels of influence.  
The “legal homogeneity” maxim requires from the EEA EFTA states (Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein)  a  constant  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  in  the  areas  covered  by  the 
Agreement. The intensity of the obligations arising from EEA law is comparable to that of 
Community law. This was confirmed in a ruling by the EFTA Court according to which the 
EEA legal order is to be situated at a half way position between supranational Community law 
and  classic  international  law  (Lazowski  2006:  131).  Control  is  exerted  by  the  EFTA 
Surveillance  Authority  with  the  power  to  launch  infringement  procedures  and  a  juridical 
monitoring body, the EFTA Court. Although both institutions are not EU organs, their point 
of reference clearly is the EU jurisprudence. The compliance record demonstrated by the EEA 
EFTA states is similar to that of the EU member states (Jónsdóttir 2008). 
While  formally  speaking  the  EEA  agreement  allows  for  country-specific  derogations  or 
adaptations to EU instruments, the EEA EFTA countries have rarely used these possibilities 
(van Stiphout 2007: 437). The only condition under which the EEA EFTA countries can insert 
exceptions  into  the  agreement  is  when  they  demonstrate  that  objective  criteria  (e.g.  size, 
sparsely populated territory) are at odds with an implementation. Also, individual EEA EFTA 
states may exercise the right of reservation to avert the inclusion of predetermined norms into 
the EEA acquis. However, the EU axiomatic insistence on the legal homogeneity within the 
EEA  territory  requires  the  proposition  of  an  equivalent  solution  by  the  responsible  Joint 
Committee which is made up of ambassadors of the EEA EFTA States, representatives from 
the  European  Commission  and  EU  Member  States.  Given  the  complexity  of  and 
interdependence between policies the EEA EFTA states have so far always agreed to include 
the contested measures into the EEA acquis sooner or later.  
The  EEA’s  institutional  set-up  mirrors  the  legal  hierarchy.  It  possesses  strong  central 
institutions (Joint Committee, EFTA Surveillance Authority, EFTA Court) meeting with high 
frequency. The most explicit institutional sign of asymmetry is the EEA EFTA states’ formal  
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exclusion from “decision-making”. The so-called dynamic incorporation procedure consists 
of the quasi-automatic transfer of the relevant acquis to the EEA EFTA countries, by 2008, 
roughly 6000 acts had been incorporated into Norwegian legislation since the entry into force 
of the EEA (Bruzelius 2008). In Norway the EEA incorporation procedure has been described 
as a “fax democracy” and academics have qualified the status of the EEA EFTA countries as  
“semi-colonial” (Tovias 2006). 
EEA EFTA countries have been compensated for their exclusion from actual decision-making 
in the EU by comparatively far-reaching decision-shaping rights in the agenda-setting and the 
policy formulation stage. On the one hand, either government representatives or experts from 
these countries may participate in expert working groups that are convened at regular intervals 
to discuss the proposed legislative proposals. On the other hand, EEA EFTA representatives 
may participate in comitology committees that assist the Commission in the exercise of its 
executive functions. Another form of organisational inclusion is participation in EU sectoral 
agencies. These horizontal structures are mainly limited to expert level deliberations which 
take place in the shadow cast by the EU legislative bodies and the EEA Joint Committee. 
Their potential is circumscribed by the openness of the respective acquis on the one and the 
respective competences of these bodies on the other hand. Therefore, any assessment of these 
opportunities needs to look at the modes of governance within the respective policy sectors. 
At the political stage the influence of the associate states is far more limited, and they have to 
rely on informal strategies, such as lobbying EU member states and building alliances with 
“like-minded” states instead. To conclude, the predominant macro-structure of the EEA is 
thus a hierarchical setting, in which EEA EFTA members have subordinated themselves to 
“foreign rule” by the EU.  
 
Swiss-EU Bilateralism 
It is more difficult to categorise the bilateral agreements in terms of the dominant structural 
mode of interaction because there is no overarching framework agreement to lay down a 
shared  obligation  for  cooperation.  Rather,  there  are  sixteen  core  bilateral  agreements, 
concluded with the EU in two packages in 1999 and 2004, and over one hundred secondary 
agreements. As a consequence, each bilateral sectoral agreement is the result of a negotiation 
process in which both sides try to minimise commitments and maximise benefits.   
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The EU’s acquis communautaire is thus not automatically the basis of the agreements; the 
consensus  brought  about  by  the  negotiations  can  be  referred  to  as  acquis  helveto-
communautaire. The obligations created by the bilateral agreements are precise although they 
might include specified derogations from the acquis, With the exception of the agreements on 
air  transport  and  the  Schengen  Association  they  fall  short  of  being  “integration  treaties”. 
Rather, the legal obligations arising under the bilateral agreements come closer to traditional 
international than to supranational EU law. The maxim underlying the relations between the 
two parties is not that of “legal homogeneity”  but the recognition of the “equivalence of 
legislation”. In addition there is no systematic monitoring, neither juridical nor political. The 
monitoring  of  compliance  with  the  obligations  contained  in  the  bilateral  agreements  is 
ensured by each one of the parties on their respective territory. 
Below  these  formally  weakly  legalised  structures  we  find  a  strong  shadow  of  hierarchy 
concealed  behind  the  core  principle  which  stipulates  the  recognition  of  equivalence  of 
legislation.  In  practice  this  recognition  amounts  to  the  incorporation  of  EU  instruments 
(regulations/directives)  into  Swiss  law,  because  the  EU  almost  only  accepts  legislation 
modelled on the acquis as “equivalent”. The EU instruments that shall be included in Swiss 
legislation are listed in the annexes to the bilateral agreements. The competence to modify 
these “technical” annexes has for the most part been delegated to the mixed committees. The 
main  difference  to  the  EEA  setting  is  the  punctual  nature  of  such  “updates”:  both  the 
frequency of changes and the substantive reach of the changes are more limited. Another “de 
facto  simulation”  of  hierarchy  results  from  the  doctrine  of  “autonomer  Nachvollzug” 
(unilateral  adaptation),  which  is  a  practice  of  voluntary  alignment  practiced  by  the Swiss 
authorities since the late 1980s. It stipulates that each new piece of legislation is evaluated 
with respect to its compatibility with EU norms.  
The absence of central coordinating institutions or overarching macro structures mirrors the 
formally weak legalisation of Swiss-EU association. Contrary to the EEA and Association 
Agreements,  there  is  no  EU-Switzerland  Association  Council  or  overarching  Joint 
Committee. Instead, relations are managed decentrally within each sectoral agreement by the 
respective “mixed committees”. The mixed committees are in charge of managing both the 
technical and the political aspects of the bilateral agreements through information exchange 
and, when necessary, extension of EU legislation relevant for Switzerland. They are also the 
place where problems with the implementation of the Agreements are discussed, and thus  
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they fulfil a sort of ad-hoc monitoring function. Finally, the lower degree of legalisation in 
Swiss-EU relations goes along with more limited decision-shaping rights compared to the 
EEA EFTA states, although access to committees or EU agencies has evolved incrementally 
in a number of sectors. 
In  sum,  Swiss-EU  Bilaterlism  is  an  interesting  case  of  formally  weakly  legalised  and 
institutionalised structures, yet infused by a strong informal shadow of hierarchy.  
 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
The  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  is  different  from  both  the  EEA  and  the  bilateral 
agreements with Switzerland, in that it is not a legal contract on its own.
1 Next to the hard law 
Association  Agreements  (AA)  concluded  with  the  Mediterranean  neighbours  and  the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) signed with the Eastern European neighbours 
the ENP includes a multiplicity of “soft law” instruments that have been adopted since 2003, 
which also differ between countries.
2 The core soft law instruments are the bilateral action 
plans outlining the reform menu that each partner country has committed itself to undertake in 
the various policy domains. The action plans are process-oriented; they do not prescribe a 
specific end, such as legal homogeneity, but promote the ENP countries’ approximation to EU 
standards.  To  realise  this  “approximation”  objective  the  EU  draws  on  a  combination  of 
hierarchical and networks modes of governance. 
The adoption of EU norms is not a legal obligation but a political commitment. With the 
exception of the provisions on the internal market and trade, the commitments inscribed in the 
Action Plans are relatively vague. This stems from the “approximation” objective according 
to which the EU’s acquis can, but must not, serve as a model for guiding third countries in the 
conduct of domestic reforms. Notwithstanding the lower degree of obligation and precision, 
monitoring is assured at the political level. ENP countries’ progress in fulfilling their action 
plan commitments is assessed every 18 months by the European Commission in “progress 
reports” that resemble the Commission’s avis and the regular progress reports issued during 
enlargement.  This  unilateral  assessment  is  complemented  by  a  consensual  monitoring 
structure in the joint Association Councils.  
In institutional terms the ENP is relatively centralised but less dense than the EEA and Swiss-
EU Bilateralism. Ministerial representatives of the ENP countries meet with the EU Troika in  
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yearly  Association/Partnership  and  Cooperation  Council  meetings.  The  Cooperation  and 
Association Committee at the ambassadorial level also meet on a yearly basis. In contrast to 
the EEA these bodies do not have the objective of aligning the legislation in the third country 
to the EU standards; instead their main function is to exchange information on the progress 
achieved in the realisation of the action plan commitments. The fact that the discussions in the 
joint Association Councils are the key monitoring instance shows that the highest political 
level wants to keep a grip on the development of the ENP, hence preserving the centralised 
characteristics of the policy. 
An important innovation of the ENP compared to previously established frameworks such as 
the Euro-Mediterranean policy is the introduction of technical subcommittees in most policy 
fields. In contrast to the diplomatic macro-structure they are composed of civil servants of the 
ENP countries, EU member states and the Commission meeting on the expert level to discuss 
joint priorities and problems encountered during implementation. Theoretically, these fora are 
comparable to the sectoral subcommittees working under the EEA Joint Committee or the 
mixed committees with Switzerland, and thus they bear the potential for more horizontal or 
symmetrical discussions based on technical expertise rather than political considerations. Yet, 
in practice some ENP countries prefer to send either high-ranking officials or diplomats.
3 A 
further feature of the decentral set-up are the informal networking mechanisms, Taiex and 
Twinning, that were first introduced during EU enlargement. These instruments link civil 
servants  from  the  member  states  with  those  in  the  ENP  countries  with  the  objective  to 
promote “approximation” in areas in which the EU lacks a precise acquis.  
To conclude, notwithstanding their common focus on promoting association to the EU on the 
basis  of  its  acquis  communautaire,  the  three  macro-institutional  types  of  neighbourhood 
policies  vary  quite  strongly  with  regard  to  their  modes  of  governance  and  the  degree  of 
hierarchy reflected therein. The EEA is clearly the most hierarchical setting, emulating to a 
far  degree  the  legal  and  institutional  supranationalism  of  the  EU.  Swiss-EU  Bilateralism 
reflects a mix of formal intergovernmentalism with a strong (informal) shadow of hierarchy. 
This shadow mainly derives from the fact that Switzerland’s “flexible integration” mainly 
occurs through legal adaptation to the acquis but less through institutions. The opposite is the 
case in the ENP which mainly combines a focus on institutional ties with elements of network 
governance in a weakly legalised setting. The first column of table 2 below summarizes these  
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governance characteristics and juxtaposes them with the sectoral modes of governance that 
we present in the following section. 
 
Sectoral diversity in external governance
4 
Do macro-institutional modes of external governance between the EU and associated third 
countries have homogenising effects at the sectoral policy level, meaning that EEA countries 
are treated differently in research or environmental policy than Switzerland or individual ENP 
countries? Or do we find specific sectoral modes of governance prevailing regardless of the 
macro-institutional set-ups and the  respective target countries instead?  In order to answer 
these questions we analyse five sectors that vary with regard to their dominant type of internal 
governance;  two  more  communitarised,  hence  hierarchical  ones  (asylum  and  immigration 
control  in  JHA,  environmental  policy),  two  intergovernmental  ones  (police  and  judicial 
cooperation, research policy) as well as one with mixed competences (air transport). This 
sample also reflects a mix of more technical versus more politicised sectors and thus allows 
controlling  for  competing  hypotheses  that  stress  the  role  of  interdependence  and  interest 
constellations. 
 
Research 
Despite its recent gain in prominence as a main pillar of the EU’s Lisbon agenda, research 
policy  is  not  communitarised.  The  main  output  of  decision-making  in  research  are  not 
directives,  regulations  or  harmonisation  measures,  but  pluri-annual  research  programmes 
defining broad research fields and an overall budget for funding research that complements 
national  research  policies  (Banchoff  2002:  3).  The  mode  of  policy-making  can  be 
characterised as a form of network governance in which the relatively open-structured overall 
research  framework  programmes  are  jointly  specified,  implemented  and  monitored  by 
national  experts  meeting  under  the  comitology  procedure  in  the  so-called  programme 
committees  and  in  a  special  intergovernmental  advisory  group  working  both  for  the 
Commission and the Council, the Scientific and Technical Research Committee (CREST). 
This  multilevel  constellation  inside  the  EU  is  complemented  by  independent 
intergovernmental  research  organisations  such  as  Cost  and  Eureka  and  transnational  fora  
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composed  of  self-governing  science  organisations  (e.g.  European  Science  Association)  or 
industry (technology platforms). 
In terms of external governance research policy is a particular case, since it does not involve 
an acquis which needs to be transferred to the associated countries. Third countries can be 
fully  or  partially  integrated  in  this  policy  area  without  facing  pressure  for  regulatory 
adaptation.  Instead,  integration  occurs  through  the  organisational  participation  in  the 
definition of funding priorities and/or in the established funding programmes. 
With the inclusion of research policy in the EEA and the conclusion of a bilateral agreement, 
Norway and Switzerland have been fully associated with this policy field. The full association 
gives  them  access  to  the  relevant  policy  networks  and  unrestricted  participation  rights. 
Although they do not have the right to vote, both EU and country representatives confirm that 
Norwegian and Swiss representatives participate as full members and that voting never takes 
place.
5 Also, both countries have established informal forms of cooperation with the EU’s 
central legislative organ, the Council of Ministers. Likewise, their research ministers have 
been invited as observers to the informal meetings of EU research ministers since 2007.
6 As a 
consequence, for Norway and Switzerland, “external governance” may most accurately be 
described as “extended network governance” with a low degree of legalisation and symmetric 
institutional ties. Interestingly, the overarching macro-structures existing in the EEA were 
reported to have no relevance for this cooperation.  
As a geographically determined space of privileged relations, the ENP fits uneasily with the 
intrinsic functional dynamics of internationalisation in research. Despite their heterogeneity, it 
can be said that most ENP countries are not natural partners for internationalisation in terms 
of compatibility of science and technology systems. Nevertheless, research policy may be 
“particularly  suited  as  an  integration  vehicle  given  the  apolitical  nature  of  cooperation  in 
science  and  technology  and  the  overall  absence  of  political  obstacles  to  progress  in 
cooperation”  (European  Commission  2008:  72),  also  because  of  its  conduciveness  to 
economic growth and modernisation. Therefore, the PCAs, AAs and ENP Action Plans all 
include  provisions  on  cooperation  and  strengthening  research  infrastructures.  In  addition, 
bilateral Science and Technology Agreements have been concluded with Ukraine, Moldova, 
Tunisia  and  Egypt,  and  relevant  provisions  are  included  for  the  southern  neighbours  in 
various declarations and instruments of the Barcelona Process.   
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In contrast to the Western neighbours, these policy documents do prescribe policy adaptation 
in terms of developing R&D capacities, including raising levels of funding, and preparing for 
integration into the European Research Area. Commitments with the Southern neighbours 
also include more specific targets such as e.g. establishing independent funding institutions 
and promoting industrial research. These prescriptions however reflect a generally low level 
of legalisation given the absence of a regulatory acquis in the EU. Our interviews confirmed 
that  both  during  the  negotiation  of  ENP  Action  Plans  and  of  the  Science  &Technology 
Agreements the ENP countries were free to set their own priorities.
7 Thus approximation to 
EU  standards  is  mainly  driven  by  the  ENP  countries’  different  degrees  of  interest  in 
modernising their research systems, rather than by external influence.  
The institutionalisation of research cooperation is more developed with the Southern than 
with the Eastern neighbours. The multilateral Monitoring Committee for Euro-Mediterranean 
Cooperation (MOCO) meets annually to exchange information and views on S&T policy in 
the Mediterranean Region; promote the coordination of national policies between its members 
and the EU; monitor S&T programmes and activities in the region and to propose action plans 
to extend the European Research Area to the whole region – some of which have found entry 
into relevant EU instruments such as the EU’s Seventh Framework Research Programme. 
This  fact,  as  well  as  the  balanced  representation  in  the  MOCO  (members  are  high-level 
officials representing the Ministers responsible for RTD from the EU member states and from 
the Mediterranean partner countries, as well as representatives from different Commission 
DGs)  reflects  relatively  symmetrical  structures  of  interaction,  despite  the  fact  that  the 
Southern neighbours (and ENP countries in general) are clearly more dependent on the EU’s 
research market than vice-versa. 
 
Transport: Aviation 
Despite the fact that transport was one of the few policy fields explicitly mentioned in the 
Treaty of Rome, a common air transport policy developed only from the late 1980s onwards. 
Three so-called liberalisation-packages between 1987 and 1992 contributed to the creation of 
an  internal  market  in  air  services.  As  a  consequence  of  market  making  policies,  market 
regulations involving issues of air traffic management and safety became dominant. In 1999, 
the launching of the Single European Sky project signalled a new effort to communitarise the  
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internal  dimension  of  air  transport.  Its  external  dimension  was  triggered  by  the  so-called 
"open skies" judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2002, according to which 
member states cannot act in isolation when negotiating international air service agreements 
(Stevens 2004). The common external aviation policy is characterised by the EU's explicit 
objective to take the EU acquis with its two dimensions of market liberalisation and control 
and safety policies and standards as the yardstick (European Commission 2005). The more the 
EU seeks to communitarise internal and external air transport governance, the more it has to 
take  into  account  the  existence  of  either  intergovernmentally  or  transgovernmentallly 
organized forms of pan- European cooperation with overlapping memberships. 
The EEA countries and Switzerland are closely integrated in the EU's aviation policy. Annex 
XIII of the EEA Agreement establishes the full association with the EU’s transport acquis. 
The provisions cover market making and market regulating aspects, including for instance 
horizontal transport issues such as social policy, consumer protection, environment, statistics 
and company law. The bilateral aviation agreement concluded with Switzerland is comparable 
in legal scope.  Interestingly, the lack of judicial macro-structure in Swiss-EU relations is 
compensated by the allocation of oversight functions to the European Commission and the 
ECJ, equivalent to the judicial control applying for the EU member states. These hierarchical 
patterns in the legal sphere go along with intensive network governance at the operational 
level. Both Norwegian and Swiss experts are well integrated in relevant technical bodies. Yet, 
given Switzerland’s location at the heart of one of the busiest aviation areas in the world 
Swiss  representatives  have  successfully  sought  a  closer  incorporation  also  into  decision 
shaping  bodies  such  as  high  level  groups  and  standard  setting  bodies,  both  EU  and  pan-
European  (e.g.  the  European  Civil  Aviation  Conference  ECAC),  the  Joint  Aviation 
Authorities JAA, Eurocontrol or the European Aviation Safety Agency EASA).  
ENP countries are significantly affected by the EU's objective to develop the wider European 
Common Aviation Area (ECAA) by 2010. The ECAA involves the twin objectives to open 
markets by 2010 and to initiate a process of regulatory convergence with the EU acquis. To 
achieve this objective the EU seeks to negotiate substantive aviation agreements with ENP 
countries  that  reach  well  beyond  existing  PCAs  and  AAs.  The  2006  EU-Morocco  Euro-
Mediterranean  Aviation  Agreement  has  been  heralded  as  the  prototype  for  any  other 
neighbouring  countries  wishing  to  harmonise  their  legislations  with  the  Community.  A 
comparable  agreement  is  currently  in  negotiation  with  Ukraine.  These  special  agreements  
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reflect  high  degrees  of  obligation  and  precision,  yet  each  contracting  party  remains 
responsible for the proper implementation in its territory and disputes are to be decided by the 
Association Council, a political body (Art. 21 and 22 of the EU-Morocco Euro-Mediterranean 
Aviation Agreement). In institutional terms the agreements build on the existing bodies, i.e. 
the  Association  Councils  which  shall  meet  at  least  once  a  year  as  Joint  Committees  (or 
additionally upon request of one party). A more pertinent role in providing an institutional 
base for interaction is played by functional pan-European aviation agencies, at least for the 
European neighbours which are members of the ECAC, the JAA and Eurocontrol. In sofar as 
these  organisations  function  on  the  basis  of  technical  expertise  rather  than  political 
considerations, they also open the opportunity for more horizontal patterns of cooperation. 
 
Environment 
Although  strongly  communitarised,  environmental  policy  reflects  an  interesting  mix  of 
hierarchical  and  so-called  “new”  modes  of  horizontal  governance,  sometimes  combined 
within  one  piece  of  legislation.  Whereas  Norway  is  fully  associated  to  the  EU’s 
environmental acquis by way of the EEA, no equivalent obligations exist with Switzerland.
8 
Commitments with the ENP countries mainly concern the so-called horizontal environmental 
acquis related to good governance, and regulatory adaptation is less explicit in overarching 
policy documents such as Action Plans. 
Given the variety of governance modes in EU environmental policy, we focus a sub-field with 
a strong international dimension, water protection. The main policy instrument here is the 
EU’s Water Framework Directive (WFD) of 2000. The WFD is a typical instrument of “new” 
environmental  governance,  reflecting  many  aspects  related  to  the  Open  Method  of 
Coordination. Its emphasis is on structuring a collaborative process in which an open-ended 
notion of good water status is jointly defined and promoted by policy networks. These policy 
networks are composed of policy-makers and stakeholders from the relevant countries who 
agree on common objectives and concrete activities in the respective national and regional 
contexts. Most interestingly, the decentralised regulatory structures implementing the WFD 
are organised along the natural geographical and hydrological units of rivers and lakes, and 
not along their administrative or political boundaries. The notion of integrated river basin 
districts  binds  the  member  states  to  involve  relevant  neighbouring  countries  into  the  
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respective  policy  networks  of  “competent  authorities”.  Often,  this  occurs  through  the 
delegation of competences to pre-existing intergovernmental water protection commissions in 
which both EU countries and neighbours are members. 
Geographic location and membership in such long-standing intergovernmental commissions 
explain why third countries increasingly come under the ambit of the EU’s water protection 
policy, even if such an obligation is missing in formal association agreements. The relevant 
acquis is the same for all countries, namely the WFD, including several other fairly precise 
directives that have been integrated therein and the political monitoring processes that go 
along (country reports and peer review). We also find relatively strong commonalities in the 
institutional parameters of this policy field. Whereas Norway and Switzerland are integrated 
in both supranational (EU Water Directors) and regional levels of policy networks (e.g. the 
International Commission for the Protection of the River Rhine for Switzerland), the Eastern 
neighbours face a comparable degree of regional institutional coupling with their participation 
in  the  Dablas  Process  for  the  protection  of  the  Danube  and  the  Black  Sea.  Although 
theoretically,  these  networks  allow  for  symmetric,  horizontal  relations,  we  find  that  they 
operate under the shadow of hierarchy. In the case of Norway and Switzerland, this mainly 
refers to other directives relevant for implementing the WFD. Cooperation in the networks is 
recorded as being fully symmetrical and these countries are esteemed for their environmental 
expertise and leadership.
9 In the case of the Eastern neighbours, we find asymmetry in the 
networks themselves which results less from the formal characteristics of these fora but from 
the properties of the third countries such as absence of compatible expertise and resources. In 
this situation, the Eastern neighbours cannot participate on an equal basis and become passive 
receivers of EU templates.  
 
Justice and Home Affairs 
The internal  governance of JHA is marked by  the coexistence of weak hierarchical legal 
integration  through  the  community  method  (in  the  first  pillar)  and  intergovernmental 
procedures  (in  the  third  pillar)  as  well  as  the  dominance  of  network  governance  through 
intensive  transgovernmentalism  (in  both  pillars).  Integration  occurs  not  only  or  primarily 
through  legislation  but  first  and  foremost  through  operational  cooperation  in 
transgovernmental networks (Lavenex 2009).   
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With the Western neighbours, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation forms a separate 
type of macro-institutional governance, Schengen/Dublin association. It is independent from 
the EEA and  constitutes one of the bilateral agreements with Switzerland. The degree of 
obligation  contained  in  the  association  agreements  resembles  that  of  the  EEA;  these 
agreements  are  dynamic  in  the  sense  that  the  associates  accept  to  incorporate  all  further 
developments of the relevant acquis following the conclusion of the agreement. The pressure 
to align with these further developments is high, provided that non-incorporation of a norm 
ultimately leads to the termination of the agreement. Yet the level of delegation is lower than 
in  the  EEA  since  enforcement  is  ensured  by  the  national  authorities  on  their  respective 
territories.  The  EFTA  Court  has  no  jurisdiction  under  the  corresponding  elements  of  the 
Agreements.  Furthermore,  the  degree  of  legalisation  differs  strongly  between  the 
communitarised (asylum, immigration) and intergovernmental parts of the JHA acquis (police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters). In the latter area the obligations are generally 
weaker and less precise. 
In institutional terms Schengen/Dublin association amounts to a progressed form of flexible 
integration into central EU structures with far ranging decision-shaping rights. The associated 
states have access to the Council of ministers at all levels of seniority through the so-called 
Comité Mixte (COMIX) procedure. Given the strong convergence of interest between the 
Western European associates and the EU member states, the former’s participation in COMIX 
meetings  is  reported  as  being  quite  symmetrical.
10  In  addition  to  these  central  legislative 
bodies,  Norway  and  Switzerland  are  well  integrated  into  policy-specific  fora  such  as  in 
asylum the so-called DubliNet system as well as the “informal” Dublin Contact Committee, 
or, in the field of police and judicial cooperation, Europol, the European Police College or 
Eurojust. 
JHA issues have a high priority in the ENP, although the situation of interdependence is very 
different than with the Western countries given the perception of the EU’s periphery as a 
source of soft security threats. ENP documents including Action Plans contain provisions on 
cooperation  on  asylum  and  immigration  (i.a.  readmission  agreements,  1951  Geneva 
Convention, border control, for the Eastern Countries approximation to the acquis) as well as 
on police and judicial cooperation. Yet the degree of obligation and precision is much weaker 
than  in  the  Schengen/Dublin  association  with  the  Western  neighbours.  The  weakness  of 
legislation undeniably constitutes a strong obstacle to efforts at policy transfer in situations  
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with conflicts of interests such as asylum. An additional difficult obstacle to EU hierarchical 
action is the lack of leverage on part of the EU in trying to impose its acquis on the ENP 
countries.  
Faced with these inherent limitations to hierarchical governance, the EU has engaged into 
intergovernmental bargaining with ENP countries on JHA such as readmission by offering 
them financial aid or visa facilitation in return for cooperation. Given the difficulty to offer 
attractive incentives, also these market-based modes of governance have faced limitations, in 
particular with the Mediterranean partners. As a consequence, the EU has turned to network 
governance such as the Söderköping Process to the East which focuses on the exchange of 
best practices and information in asylum matters or operational cooperation in border control 
(Lavenex & Wichmann 2009).  
The limits of hierarchical interaction are even more pronounced in the areas still subject to 
intergovernmentalism  such  as  police  and  judicial  cooperation.  In  the  absence  of  a  strong 
legislative  EU  acquis,  the  majority  of  obligations  in  these  domains  are  international  law 
obligations such as relevant UN Conventions. To entice the third countries to comply with 
these international obligations the EU has adopted a sort of “positive sanction” in a regulation 
stating that preferential access to the internal market will depend on compliance with the UN 
instruments (Council of the European Union 2005). The monitoring of compliance is also 
embedded in international fora such as for drugs policy the International Narcotics Control 
Board or, for the fight against corruption, the GRECO group of the Council of Europe. In 
addition to these international fora, EU agencies such as Europol and Eurojust have had first 
contacts with ENP countries. Yet, institutional ties are not really inclusive as the preeminence 
of  capacity-building  programmes  directed  by  the  EU  shows  (e.g.  the  Belarus,  Moldova, 
Ukraine Anti Drugs Programme (BUMAD) and the Eurmed Justice and Police programme). 
Apart  from  asymmetric  interdependence  and  hence  often  incompatible  interests,  inclusive 
network governance is hampered by political considerations such as the weakness of civil 
liberties standards in the ENP countries. 
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Sectoral versus Macro Structures of Governance 
The review of cooperation at the sectoral level shows that hierarchal, market and network 
types of external governance prevail in neighbourhood relations, quite independently from the 
overarching macro-structures of an association. Table 2 summarises the sectoral modes of 
governance and juxtaposes them to the macro structures as well as with internal modes of 
governance in the sectors. 
Table 3: Summary of Macro- and Sectoral Modes of Governance 
EEA  
  Macro-
Policy 
Research  Transport: 
aviation 
Environ-
ment: WFD 
Asylum*  Police 
Coop.* 
Obligation  ++  +  ++  ++  ++  + 
Precision  ++  -  ++  +  +  + 
Delegation  ++  -  ++  -  -  - 
Centralisation  ++  -  ++  -  -  - 
Density  ++  +  +  ++  ++  ++ 
Exclusiveness  ++  -  -  -  -  - 
Swiss-EU Bilateralism 
Obligation  +  +  ++  -  ++  + 
Precision  +  -  ++  +  +  + 
Delegation  -  -  ++  -  -  - 
Centralisation  -  -  +  -  -  - 
Density  -  +  +  ++  ++  ++ 
Exclusiveness  +  -  -  -  -  - 
ENP** 
Obligation  -  +  ++  +  +  + 
Precision  -  -  ++  -  +  + 
Delegation  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Centralisation  +  -  +  -  -  - 
Density  +  + (S), - (E)  +  +  -  + 
Exclusiveness  +  -  +  -/+  ++  + 
Internal MoG             
Obligation    +  ++  ++  ++  + 
Precision    -  ++  +  +  + 
Delegation    -  ++  -  ++  + 
Centralisation    -  ++  -  +  - 
Density    +  +  ++  ++  ++ 
Exclusiveness             
* It should be noted that for the EEA countries and Switzerland, association in matters relating to asylum and 
police cooperation is regulated in a separate, common agreement (the Schengen-Dublin association, see above). 
** The values for the ENP countries refer to the ENP countries with the strongest form of association in the 
sector (with the exclusion of Israel, see endnote 4) 
 
A first important observation is that the macro structures do not reflect on the sectoral modes 
of governance. The clearest case of institutional de-coupling is research policy which is fully  
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dissociated from the macro structures and where we find exactly the same patterns of network 
governance across countries (with the exception of the eastern neighbours). But also in the 
other sectors the legal and institutional patterns share more commonalities with the internal 
modes of sectoral governance than with the macro-institutional set-up.  
Notwithstanding  its  hierarchical  macro-institutional  setting,  the  EEA  display  no  strong 
hierarchy in the policy fields under study. An exception is the aviation sector which clearly 
reflects the single market legislation and its dynamics. Furthermore, despite the very different 
macro-institutional relationship with the EU, sectoral governance patterns with Switzerland 
are  nearly  identical  with  those  in  the  EEA.  The  macro-institutional  distinction  between 
integration  through  law  and  low  degrees  of  institutionalisation  in  Swiss-EU  bilateralism 
vanishes from a sectoral perspective. Here, we find in all cases dense interaction with sector-
specific EU institutions, even when a formal bilateral agreement is lacking (environment). A 
remarkable feature of the ENP is that the sectoral commitments have always higher values of 
obligation  and  precision  than  those  at  the  macro-institutional  level,  which  only  stipulate 
general approximation. These dimensions tend to mirror the qualities of the respective internal 
acquis,  especially  when  sectoral  association  is  strong,  such  as  e.g.  in  the  case  of  the 
Moroccan-EU aviation cooperation. The most visible impact of the ENP’s macro-structures 
concerns the dimension of delegation with the Commission’s political monitoring prevailing 
across  sectors.  In  institutional  terms,  the  proliferation  of  decentralised,  sectoral  fora  of 
interaction also applies to the ENP countries. However, here, relations tend to be clearly more 
exclusive  than  with  the  Western  neighbours,  only  with  the  exception  of  some  parts  of 
environmental cooperation and of research policy. 
How can we explain this dissociation between modes of governance at the sectoral level and 
overarching macro-institutional association frameworks? 
Our findings provide strong evidence for the preeminence of institutional continuities between 
the ways how the EU governs internally and its external modes of governance. This applies 
both  to  the  legalisation  of  commitments  and  to  the  institutional  qualities  of  interactions. 
Although it is true that by way of the notion of “legal homogeneity”, the EEA reflects a much 
higher degree of obligation towards EU norms, this legal quality has little relevance in policy 
areas operating by other modes than legislative  policy-making such as research policy or 
aspects of JHA. The same is true for the precision of rules which cannot be more precise than 
what is included in the acquis.   
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Not only the legal, also the institutional characteristics of external governance are conditioned 
by the internal organisational context of particular policies. The existence of decentralised 
sector-specific  institutions  such  as  agencies  (e.g.  Europol,  EASA);  committees  (e.g. 
programme committees in research policy), or networks (e.g. JHA networks, international 
water  commissions)  tend  to  reduce  the  importance  of  the  central  macro-institutions 
responsible for implementation (EEA Joint Committee, Association Councils and even ENP 
subcommittees).  While  the  agenda  of  these  macro-level  monitoring  bodies  tends  to  be 
perpetually overloaded,
11 the opening of sectoral fora towards associated countries allows for 
functional  specialisation  and  enhances  significantly  the  density  of  interaction,  quite 
independently from existing legal obligations.  
Beyond these commonalities, however, our results also show important differences in the 
comparison between the ENP countries and the western neighbours. The main differences are, 
firstly, the macro-institutional system of political monitoring in the ENP, which applies to all 
sectors, and, secondly, the lesser inclusivity of organisational ties. Are these differences a 
result of superior EU bargaining power towards these countries, or rather a consequence of 
the  stronger  heterogeneity  of  domestic  political  structures  (Lavenex  and  Schimmelfennig 
2009)? The contrast between the inclusive organisational forms of JHA cooperation with the 
western  neighbours  and  the  exclusiveness  of  corresponding  ENP  relations  shows  that 
asymmetric interdependence matters. In such politicised or even securitised matters, the EU 
does not replicate the inclusive network governance models practiced internally or in relations 
with the western neighbours. Without doubt, the strong compatibility of domestic structures 
(political, economic, social, administrative) in the western neighbours is also conducive to the 
extension  of  internal  modes  of  governance  in  a  non-hierarchical  manner.  The  stronger 
heterogeneity  of  the  eastern  and  southern  neighbours  not  only  accounts  for  weaker  legal 
commitments,  but  also  for  the  looser  and  more  asymmetric  forms  of  organisational 
interaction.  In  addition,  it  may  be  assumed  that  power  and  domestic  structures  will  have 
effects on the effectiveness of external governance in terms of rule adoption and application, 
but this question is beyond the scope of this article. To sum up, whereas these variables do 
explain the differences we find between the countries, they cannot account for the variation 
we find across sectors, which is due to the reflection of the internal modes of governance.  
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Conclusion  
Contrary to the wide majority of studies that try to characterise EU external governance by 
looking  at  the  macro  structures  of  association  relations,  our  analysis  has  shown  that 
overarching foreign policy initiatives such as the EEA, Swiss-EU Bilateralism or the ENP 
have  little  impact  on  the  modes  how  the  EU  seeks  to  expand  its  policy  boundaries  in 
individual sectors. In contrast, modes of external governance follow sectoral dynamics which 
are astonishingly stable across countries. Even in the light of very different constellations of 
interdependence between the EU and its Western, Eastern and Southern neighbours, macro 
structures remain secondary to these sectoral patterns.  
By highlighting the importance of institutional contingencies in projecting governance modes 
from the internal to the external constellation, these findings call into question the rational 
capacity  to  “steer”  external  governance  in  neighbourhood  relations.  Below  these  foreign 
policy grand designs, our analysis underlines the decentralised and incremental character of 
projecting EU rules beyond EU borders. Although our findings confirm the pervasiveness of 
power in neighbourhood relations, in sum, the dynamics and patterns of external governance 
reflect the expanding realms of functionalist regional integration rather than a geopolitical 
strategy of an emerging international actor. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1  The  ENP  countries  are  Algeria,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Egypt,  Georgia,  Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine. 
2 For reasons of space, we do not deal with the multilateral dimension of association policies 
(e.g. the Barcelona Process and the newly launched Union for the Mediterranean and the 
Eastern Partnership). These multilateral initiatives supplement the bilateral relationships with 
the EU fora regrouping the neighbouring regions but do not open additional access to EU 
institutions. 
3 This information is based on a review of subcommittee documents as well as interviews with 
participants. 
4 In this section, we do not deal with the special case of Israel which, although part of the 
ENP, has many specific bilateral arrangements at the sectoral level. 
5 Interviews EU 44-47; Norway 2,4; Switzerland 8, 10. 
6 Interview Norway 2. 
7 Interview Morocco 2. 
8 Switzerland has only concluded a bilateral agreement on association to the European 
Environmental Agency. This covers participation in exchange of information, but no 
obligations of legal approximation.  
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9 Interviews EU 43; Norway 2,3; Switzerland 2;4.  
10 Interviews Switzerland 12-16. 
11 For instance, the TREN-Sub Committees under the ENP are in charge of cooperation in 
transport, research, environment and energy questions. It is no surprise that agendas are 
overloaded and many question are simply not discussed at this level. 
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